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博弈论 英文1.Consider the following game with perfect information
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博弈论 英文
1.Consider the following game with perfect information.N=2 players,1and 2.They start the game with 1RMB each.Player 1 moves first.Each player has the option to stop(S) or continue(C).If a player chooses S,both players receive the amount they got so far; If a player chooses C,he loses 1RMB and 2RMB go to his rival.Alternatively,the game stops when both players got 4RMB.Find all subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.2 players game (G)
(Payoff)
2 A B C
1
A 5,5 0,11 0,0
B 11,0 4,4 0,0
C 0,0 0,0 0,0
Consider a game consisting of 3 prepetitions of G,with S=1.Is it possible to support (A,A) in some repetition of the game at equilibrium?If yes,show the strategies.
3.Consider the 2 players game.
(Payoff)
2 L R
1
U 1,0 1,1
C 1,1 0,0
D 0,1 2,0
Discuss the following statement:"The iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies doesn't eliminate all NE(Nash Equilibrium)" (In maximium 10 lines).
博弈论 英文
1.Consider the following game with perfect information.N=2 players,1and 2.They start the game with 1RMB each.Player 1 moves first.Each player has the option to stop(S) or continue(C).If a player chooses S,both players receive the amount they got so far; If a player chooses C,he loses 1RMB and 2RMB go to his rival.Alternatively,the game stops when both players got 4RMB.Find all subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.2 players game (G)
(Payoff)
2 A B C
1
A 5,5 0,11 0,0
B 11,0 4,4 0,0
C 0,0 0,0 0,0
Consider a game consisting of 3 prepetitions of G,with S=1.Is it possible to support (A,A) in some repetition of the game at equilibrium?If yes,show the strategies.
3.Consider the 2 players game.
(Payoff)
2 L R
1
U 1,0 1,1
C 1,1 0,0
D 0,1 2,0
Discuss the following statement:"The iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies doesn't eliminate all NE(Nash Equilibrium)" (In maximium 10 lines).
1.Consider the following game with perfect information.N=2 players,1and 2.They start the game with 1RMB each.Player 1 moves first.Each player has the option to stop(S) or continue(C).If a player chooses S,both players receive the amount they got so far; If a player chooses C,he loses 1RMB and 2RMB go to his rival.Alternatively,the game stops when both players got 4RMB.Find all subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.2 players game (G)
(Payoff)
2 A B C
1
A 5,5 0,11 0,0
B 11,0 4,4 0,0
C 0,0 0,0 0,0
Consider a game consisting of 3 prepetitions of G,with S=1.Is it possible to support (A,A) in some repetition of the game at equilibrium?If yes,show the strategies.
3.Consider the 2 players game.
(Payoff)
2 L R
1
U 1,0 1,1
C 1,1 0,0
D 0,1 2,0
Discuss the following statement:"The iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies doesn't eliminate all NE(Nash Equilibrium)" (In maximium 10 lines).
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